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Abstract 
 
Under certain circumstances, humans tend to 
behave in irrational ways, leading to situations in 
which they make undesirable choices. The concept of 
digital nudging addresses these limitations of bounded 
rationality by establishing a libertarian paternalist 
alternative to nudge users in virtual environments 
towards their own preferential choices. Thereby, 
choice architectures are designed to address biases 
and heuristics involved in cognitive thinking. As 
research on digital nudging has become increasingly 
popular in the Information Systems community, an 
increasing necessity for ethical guidelines has emerged 
around this concept to safeguard its legitimization in 
distinction to e.g. persuasion or manipulation. 
However, reflecting on ethical debates regarding 
digital nudging in academia, we find that current 
conceptualizations are scare. This is where on the 
basis of existing literature, we provide a 
conceptualization of ethical guidelines for the design of 
digital nudges, and thereby aim to ensure the 
applicability of nudging mechanisms in virtual 
environments.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In recent years, “digital nudging” has become an 
important research focus in the information systems 
(IS) community (see e.g. [1-4]; [54-61]). Thaler and 
Sunstein first conceptualized the idea of nudging as a 
form of overt and predictable behavior change in their 
work [5]. They state that nudging methods, e.g. 
encouraging prosocial behavior, can be surprisingly 
effective, while being libertarian, meaning that they 
leave people emancipated in their freedom of choice by 
not excluding any possible choice, nor introducing 
economic incentives to extrinsically alter behavior [5]. 
Critics argue that nudging is manipulative in that it 
undermines people’s autonomy [6], by influencing the 
decision-making process and taking advantage of 
predictable irrational reactions that result from 
heuristics, biases and psychological mechanisms ([7]; 
[8-9]). Individuals are susceptible to be influenced in 
their decision-making processes as they fall back on 
heuristics, biases, and psychological mechanisms [2]. 
Digital nudging is implemented in virtual 
environments to e.g. simplify the information and 
option overflow. However, whenever IS design aims to 
influence human behavior, IS scholars should also 
address ethical concerns ([10-12]). Against this 
background, the ethical legitimization of nudging is 
controversially discussed in literature.    
It is important to discuss and define nudging in 
distinction to other regulatory mechanisms such as 
manipulation (infringement of autonomy), to better 
apprehend the ethical debate on nudging. Due to the 
difficulty to distinguish both concepts and the premise 
that general ethical abstractions often lead to 
insufficient and perplexing results [13], we hereby aim 
to concretize the ethical debate on nudging. More 
specifically, with the increasing importance of IS at 
present, and the increasing use of e.g. artificial 
intelligence, it is important to extend the debate on 
ethical legitimizations of nudges to the digital context.   
Yet, according to Renaud and Zimmermann [14], despite the 
growing importance of ethical discussions in IS, research on 
ethics is only slowly emerging. With this work, we aim to 
contribute by providing ready to use ethical guidelines, 
which transfer knowledge derived from definitory and ethical 
discussions in (offline) nudging to the online context, in order 
to support designers of digital nudges. Thereby, we align 
with the differentiated view on ethics and morality as 
suggested by Stahl [15] and further discussed by [16]. In 
literature, ethics and morality are often used interchangeably 
[17-18] and are jointly described as “customs, good practices 
or expected behavior” ([19], p. 145). However, the 
differentiation between morality, understood as rules or 
norms within a society and ethics, conceptualized as the 
justification of these morals [15], provides a better 
generalizability. Namely, that nudge designers with different 
understandings of morality may still follow the same 
universal ethical frameworks and therefore collectively find 
applicability of our guidelines [19]. Moreover, as part of our 
contribution, the guidelines may also provide a standard upon 
which designers can be held accountable for.  
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we 
will provide the background and basic understandings 
of the nudging concept by emphasizing on ethical 
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aspects of nudging in regard to libertarian paternalism 
and manipulation. Thereafter, in section 3, we will 
present our research design, before we work towards 
ethical guidelines in digital contexts, which are derived 
from existing literature in section 4. In section 5, we 
will present our discussion, followed by a summary 
and outlook to future research in section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical background  
 
2.1 Bounded rationality and digital nudging 
 
A short introduction into behavioral science, and 
existing cognitive processes guiding human decision-
making provide a basic understanding of ethical 
discourses in nudging. Bounded rationality and the 
underlying idea of decision-making heuristics is based 
on the assumptions that humans dispose over two 
interconnecting cognitive systems: the unreflective 
(system 1) and the reflective (system 2) [5; 20]. 
Humans most regularly use unreflective (automatic) 
thinking. It is fast, effortless, relies on cognitive 
heuristics, and biases [20-21], and enables individuals 
to process multiple thoughts simultaneously. The 
reflective system, in contrast, is slow, and effortful as it 
comprises conscious and deliberate thinking [20-21]. 
Here, individuals process information sequentially, 
allowing them to critically reflect and analyze the 
information. Such ‘bounded rationality’ [20], is the 
underlying basis for the concept of nudging. 
In this context, a nudge can be defined as “(...) any 
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives” ([5], p. 6). It is always intended to either 
alter a person’s unreflective thinking and consequent 
automatic behavior, or trigger the decision-making 
processes in the reflective system to guide conscious 
decisions, therefore altering choice [5]. Transferred to 
the virtual environment, digital nudging emphasizes on 
the medium and digital instruments through which 
nudges can influence choice architectures. It can be 
defined as the “use of user-interface design elements to 
guide people’s behavior in digital choice 
environments” [12, p. 1] or a “a subtle form of using 
design, information and interaction elements to guide 
user behavior in digital environments, without 
restricting the individual’s freedom of choice” [1, p. 3]. 
The tools and techniques used in digital nudging affect 
the same psychological mechanisms (i.e. biases, 
heuristics) as in the offline context. Since digital 
interfaces are always created by a choice architect and 
do not appear randomly, it is crucial to understand the 
design of digital (user) interfaces as the environment 
which influences decisions [2].    
Zhang and Xu [26] found that transparency and the 
attitude towards privacy settings can be improved, 
showing the effectiveness of digital privacy nudges in 
mobile apps. Similarly, Weinmann et al. [12] 
acknowledged that opt-in or op-out default settings 
have a big influence on online user behavior. Default-
setting research further reveals that nudges can (1) 
positively influence environmentally sound decision-
making during [27] or (2) decrease (online) 
procrastination behavior in students [28]. More recent 
studies on online privacy assessed that the combination 
of different claims and supporting arguments is most 
promising to nudge an increase in privacy concerns [2]. 
Meanwhile, providing information about the 
incompatibility of goods during the purchasing process 
improves the online shopping behavior [29], while 
digital nudging may also influence users to reflect on 
their own sharing behavior and potentially related 
privacy concerns [30].   
To this day, digital nudging receives less attention 
in enterprise settings, though it has great potential in 
working environments [32]. Kretzer and Maedche [3] 
pre-defined so-called “social nudges” which targeted a 
variety of different effects such as cohesion, business 
function, geographical distances, and hierarchy. In an 
experimental setting, they were then able to show a 
positive effect of their social nudges on the decision-
making of users (e.g. enterprise report 
recommendations) [3]. 
 
2.2 Regulatory mechanisms and manipulation  
 
The academic discourse on regulatory mechanisms 
involves (1) architecture (or code), as an alteration of 
the physical or digital environment to make alternative 
decisions less appealing, (2) libertarian paternalism, as 
a mechanism to positively influence rational decision-
making, and (3) mandated disclosure (or notice) 
entailing the distribution of facts to influence informed 
decision-making [33]. While code was the first concept 
to emerge [34], it generally entails a manipulative 
character as choice architectures are influenced 
through sanctions [34] or other forms of governmental 
control to influence citizen behavior such as speed 
bumps to regulate driving speed [33]. Thereafter, 
nudging emerged and addressed decision-making 
based on the bounded rationality of humans as a way 
of aiding the choice selection of preferential options 
within existing choice architectures, rather than 
constructing choice architectures in a mandated and 
strictly paternalistic way [5]. However, as Thaler and 
Sunstein acknowledge the (soft) paternalistic character 
of nudges, they emphasize the libertarian aspect of 
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nudging (e.g. the option to choose differently as 
nudged by authorities) as the distinguishing factor 
between nudging and manipulation [33]. 
A commonly used definition describes 
manipulation as “intentionally causing or encouraging 
people to make the decisions one wants them to make, 
by actively promoting their (decision-)making (…) in 
ways that rational persons would not want to make 
their decisions” ([35], p. 33). From our point of view, 
this definition likely applies to the idea of code. 
Moreover, nudging critics argue that nudging has a 
manipulative character [36]. Despite the efforts of 
Thaler and Sunstein [5] to legitimize nudging by 
distinguishing it from code, there is still continuous 
criticism regarding a clear understanding of the 
economic incentives or the lack of defined 
circumstances for the removal or addition of options 
[36]. In line with the criticism, the nudging concept 
does not provide a clarification nor do legitimizing 
conditions exist to differentiate nudging from 
manipulation. In the effort of closing this gap, we will 
review existing literature on more detailed approaches 
to define nudging and distinguish nudges from 
manipulation, before building our ethical guidelines on 
the basis thereof.   
Hansen [37] draws the conclusion that there are two 
possibilities for the definition of a nudge. One being 
that nudges pursue paternalistic motives, which 
simplifies their ethical legitimization as the motive of 
the nudger has to be based on the interests of the 
nudgee [37]. The other conceptualizing nudging from a 
technical perspective as the effort to influence human 
judgement, choice or behavior in predictable ways 
where rational decision-making in line with one’s own 
preferential choice set falls short to bounded rationality 
(e.g. due to cognitive boundaries, biases, routines) 
[37]. In consequence, and contrary to Thaler and 
Sunstein [5], here nudges (1) exclude relevant choice 
options, (2) grant extrinsic incentives, and (3) provide 
rational information and arguments [37]. In this 
definition, nudges are not necessarily paternalistic, 
therefore not always align with the preferences of the 
nudgee. Instead, this definition is more suitable for 
practical use because it includes both, nudges that have 
paternalistic motives as well as third-party interests. 
This is where nudging reaches its conceptual 
limitations because it is originally not laid out to 
include non-libertarian phenomena [38], yet, in reality 
many nudges have long been used for such purposes.   
According to Grüne-Yanoff [39], it is impossible to 
consider all individual nudgee preferences for the 
construction of a choice architect. Nudging and 
especially digital nudging, always contain some 
prejudice towards certain choices. ‘Subconscious’ 
nudges often reach the biggest effect [7], which 
particularly decreases the incentive for designers of 
digital nudges to aim at transparent implementations. 
Moreover, the implementation of non-transparent 
nudges bares one of the most central ethical concerns 
and reservations against nudging as transparency is one 
of the most important legitimizing conditions for the 
distinction between nudging and manipulation [5].  
In regard to the ethical debate on nudging, research 
has provided a few different perspectives. On the basis 
of her conceptual paper on possible aspects 
counteracting the side-effects (e.g. distrust) or 
autonomy concerns of nudging, Clavien [65] argues 
that shared preference justifications (all affected 
nudgees agree with the goals pursued by the nudger) 
are the most adequate to ensure ethical legitimization 
of nudges. Meanwhile, Blumenthal-Darby and 
Burroughs [66] focused their work on the identification 
of ethically relevant dimensions in form of a list of 
considerations that must be acknowledged when choice 
architectures are being influenced.    
In his analyses of case studies, Engelen [64] 
establishes a so-called list of criteria and their 
suggested contextual importance, which health 
practitioners should consider when nudging their 
patients. However, in a response to Engelen [64], 
Fowler and Roberts [67] criticize his work and suggest 
broadening its perspective to include a wider variety of 
cases for analyses, on top of the perspectives of those 
affected by the nudges as well as an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the implemented nudges. In light of 
the existing work on digital nudging and ethics it 
becomes apparent that though there have been some 
efforts to incorporate ethical standards into nudging, to 
this day two aspects are still missing: (1) the evaluation 
of ethical standards in digital nudging and (2) the 
introduction of ready to use guidelines for the actual 
design of nudges. This is also supported by Lembcke et 
al. [68] who point out, that an “integration of practical 
ethical guidelines into (an) existing framework” is yet 
to be done” (p. 13). We agree that the existing body of 
knowledge is still lacking a set of guidelines that can 
be utilized by designers in order to allow theory to 
actually inform practice. That is why our work set out 
to provide both aspects, thereby closing this gap.  
 
3. Method 
 
On the basis of the provided definitions and first 
aspects to distinguish nudging from manipulation, we 
now introduce our literature analysis. We analyzed 
literature on regulatory mechanisms, nudging, and 
persuasion. We built our methodological approach 
based on the framework by vom Brocke et al. [40] and 
aligned our literature review with the categorization by 
Cooper [41], to assure a justified scope in line with the 
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goal and target group (Fig. 1). The goal of our 
literature analysis is a thorough representation of the 
ethical debate on nudging. Moreover, our goal was to 
review other potential concepts to provide a holistic 
foundation for the derivation of ethical guidelines. The 
selection process was not entirely neutral as we pre-
selected relevant publications, which fit our goal and 
aligned with the IS context. With our work we aim to 
address scholars in nudging related topics and 
designers or practitioners implementing nudges in 
virtual environments.  
 
Table 1. Visualization and categorization 
approach (Cooper, [41]; vom Brocke et al., 
[40]). 
 
 
Forward and backward searches on all identified 
research articles allowed us to include relevant 
literature e.g. on regulatory mechanisms. Hereby we 
took a particular interest in publications discussing 
ethics and conceptual research methodologies. We 
derived our ethical guidelines iteratively by comparing 
relevant concepts and frameworks (e.g. [68]). 
The process of deriving the ethical guidelines for 
the design of nudges is twofold. We first used a 
categorization scheme based on the framework as 
introduced by Hansen and Jespersen [42], 
distinguishing between transparent and non-transparent 
nudges in combination with system 1, unreflective and 
system 2, reflective thinking. In a second step, we 
closely regarded the identified literature to derive our 
guidelines in a stepwise approach. Altogether, we used 
a descriptive research methodology by casting a light 
on a current issue and gradually building on already 
existing work. Accordingly, the ethical guidelines we 
introduce in the following were developed on the basis 
of past work and the idea, that an ethical approach to 
the design of nudges should consider transparency and 
the cognitive thinking processes of the target audience 
as the two starting points of consideration.  
 
4. Results: ethical guidelines for the design 
of digital nudges 
 
Our guidelines assist and provide a ready to use check-
list, to guide researchers and practitioner in the design 
process of nudges. In line with this goal we provide a 
universal framework that applies to all digital nudges, 
and most importantly for all designers independent of 
their occupational or epistemological background.  
 
4.1 Transparency as a legitimizing condition 
for nudges   
 
While it seems logical in theory that individuals 
always have the freedom to choose differently than 
what they are being nudged towards [5], a broad 
variety of nudges are not transparent and therefore 
non-paternalistic. Consequently, nudging gives 
individuals the theoretical option to choose differently, 
but practically their behavior is changed in a way that 
does not provide options to vary choices.  
Given that nudges always have to be transparent 
[5], it is crucial to regard transparency in more detail. 
Namely, (digital) nudges can be distinguished as 
transparent and non-transparent [43]. It is the non-
transparent types of nudges that fall under the 
manipulation objection as they work subliminally and 
are usually not striking to the nudgee [46]. Considering 
the unreflective (system 1) and reflective (system 2) 
cognitive systems, we recognize that there are different 
forms of influence between these two types of nudges.  
Since system 1 nudges influence (e.g. simplify) 
choices, they can infringe an individual’s autonomy, if 
undetected by the nudgee [23]. System 2 nudges alter a 
nudgee’s reflective thinking (e.g. habits) [23], possibly 
influencing a shift in behaviour (e.g. exclude choice). 
However, non-transparent system 1 nudges can only be 
legitimate, if preceded by some type of information or 
clarification about the nudge. This precondition cannot 
apply to non-transparent system 2 nudges, as the 
nudger intentionally excludes possible choices, leading 
to an intentional and unethical manipulation of the 
contextual environment and consequent behaviour. 
This concludes that non-transparent nudges have to be 
used in a disclosed manner and the nudgees have to be 
able to intervene and resist the triggered behavioral 
change at all times.  
Wilkinson [47] supports this distinguished view of 
non-transparent system 1 and 2 nudges by stating that 
nudges, which neither qualify as a form of intentional 
influence on choice (unreflective system 1) nor inflict 
Character-
istics 
Categories 
1 focus research 
outcomes 
research 
methods 
theories appli-
cations 
2 goal integration  criticism  central 
issues  
3 organi-
zation 
historical  conceptual  method-
logical  
4 pers-
pective 
neutral representation  espousal of position  
5 au-
dience 
specialized 
scholars  
general 
scholars  
practition
ers/ 
politician
s 
general 
public 
6 cov-
erage 
exhaus-
tive  
exhaustive 
and 
selective 
represent
ative  
central/ 
pivotal  
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on or pervert an individual’s decision-making process 
and consequent behavior (reflective system 2), can be 
considered manipulation. Therefore, under the given 
considerations, which we will also further discuss as 
“legitimizing conditions”, ethical nudges can either be 
transparent or non-transparent (see e.g. Table 3).  
 
4.2 Easy-resistibility as a legitimizing condition 
for (non-)transparent nudges 
 
In line with Thaler and Sunstein [5], the original 
choice sets of a nudged person are limitless and should 
not be inhibited by external factors. Accordingly, 
Saghai [48] suggests, that if choice architects are used 
to shape choices, users must also be given the option to 
resist. Thaler and Sunstein [5] agree by stating that 
nudges should be “easy and cheap to avoid” (p. 9).  
According to Saghai [48], easy resistibility is 
provided, when a nudgee has the ability and chance to 
become aware of how the nudge is steering the 
individual towards a certain behavior; when a nudgee 
has the ability to oppose the triggered behavior or 
choice; or when the influence of the nudge is not 
undermining the nudgee’s attention-bringing or 
inhibitory capacities. We conclude that non-transparent 
system 1 nudges can only be legitimate, if easy 
resistibility is ensured. Meanwhile, non-transparent 
system 2 nudges are excluded from this legitimization 
as a nudgee has no ability to oppose influence taking 
he or she is unaware of. 
 
4.3 Non-controllability as a legitimizing 
condition for (non-)transparent nudges 
 
Moreover, Saghai [48] also states that substantially 
non-controlling nudges, shaping the environment 
through intentional choice architectures may be 
libertarian. This means, that the nudger should not take 
any measures to violate the autonomy of the nudgee, 
such e.g. incentives or coercion.   
The substantial non-controlling condition therefore 
protects the nudgee from influences that change the 
individual’s perspective in a subliminal or even 
manipulative way. However, as it can be argued that 
resistibility is a subjective criterion, following the 
argument by Faden and Beauchamp [49], Saghai [48] 
suggests that objective views of resistibility align with 
the perception of the average person. We summarize 
that to distinguish digital nudging and (non-libertarian) 
manipulation, we first acknowledge prejudices as a 
constituent of all decision-making environments, 
especially in the digital world.  
Further, we acknowledge, that if nudgers construct 
choice architectures they have to do so transparently, 
include a possibility of resistance, and avoid extrinsic 
incentives. This is also expressed by the term “easy 
resistibility”, which is often used in the nudging 
context. One may hence speak of manipulation when a 
non-transparent nudge is implemented without any 
preceding information, and is further perceived as an 
unwanted, disfavored alteration of decision-making 
processes in digital environments. According to our 
provided arguments and conditions to distinguish 
paternalism from manipulation, Table 2 provides an 
overview and categorization scheme of the essential 
conditions for legitimate nudges as well as legitimizing 
conditions for non-transparent nudges that we derived 
from the literature. Further, Table 2 also resembles the 
basic frame, on the basis of which we derived our 
ethical guidelines in Table 3. Nudge designers need to 
be mindful of the public welfare or normative incentive 
applying to their target group (Step 1) [69], and use 
this knowledge as the basis on which nudging goals 
(Step 2) and design principles (Step 3) can be derived, 
before their evaluation (Step 4).   
 
Table 2. Summary of ethically legitimizing 
conditions of nudges 
 
Hence, we distinguish nudges that affect the 
reflective thinking from manipulative nudges that 
affect the unreflective thinking, if they are non-
transparent or according to [46] remain undetected by 
the nudgee. In regards to non-transparent nudges we 
are now able to further derive legitimizing conditions 
of ethical nudges. Based on existing literature 
regarding the basic characteristics of (digital) nudging 
as well as the described legitimizing conditions, Table 
3 provides ethical guidelines in form of a checklist that 
has to be satisfied in order to assure the design of 
ethical digital nudges. 
  
 
Essential 
conditions  
Legitimizing 
Conditions  Authors 
Libertarian 
Paternalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transparency [43]; [5]; [37] 
System 1: easy 
resistibility, 
non-controlling 
[42]; [7]; [46]; [50] 
[48] 
System 2: easy 
resistibility,  
non-controlling 
[48] 
Non-transparency  
System 1: 
disclosure, consent, 
easy resistibility,  
non-controlling  
[50]; [42]; [47] 
System 2: nudges 
are manipulative 
and beyond 
legitimization 
[51]; [47]; [42] 
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Table 3. Ethical Guidelines for the 
Construction of Digital Nudges 
 
5. Discussion  
 
As supported by research of [1] and [2], the nudger 
has to understand the intentions of potential users and 
their heuristics as well as biases in the first step. 
 
 
This includes acknowledging that the targeted nudgees 
may experience both, unreflective and reflective 
thinking during their interaction with the nudge and 
consequent decision-making process. In the 
consecutive second step the nudger can now derive the 
Ethical Guidelines for Digital Nudging: A stepwise approach  
Step 1: Understand the intentions of potential users and their 
cognitive heuristics and biases 
 
    the target group has been thoroughly identified 
 
     the preferential choice set of your  target group has been identified 
Step 2: Derive the goals of digital nudging 
 
 
    the goals are in alignment with the users’ preferential  
  choice set and/ or stem from good intentions. They benefit and do not    
  harm the user.  
    the potential impact is predictable 
Step 3: Design and implement the nudge 
System 1 (Unreflective Thinking) fast, unconscious decision making & parallel/ convergent thinking 
Transparent 
 
 
    the choice architecture is 
  presented in the most  
  simplified way 
Non-transparent justification for the need for  
non-transparency is given 
Easy resistibility 
 
    the nudge is easy and  
 cheap to avoid. There are no   
 costs to avoiding the nudge. 
Disclosure    simplified information about  
 the nudge is provided 
Consent   consent forms are provided 
requiring users to thoroughly  
read & opt-in to the terms and  
conditions to ensure informed  
consent, or informational nudges  
signaling preselected default-settings 
are provided, in cases were informed    
   consent was already established 
Non-controlling 
 
   no incentive/ coercion was  
introduced to influence  
choice 
Easy resistibility    the nudge is easy and  
cheap to avoid. There are no   
costs to avoiding the nudge. 
Non-controlling    no incentive/ coercion was  
introduced to influence  
choice. 
System 2 (Reflective Thinking) slow, conscious & sequential/ critical thinking 
Transparent 
 
    the choice architecture is 
presented in a simple and  
comprehensive way 
  Non-transparent 
 
 
Designing non-transparent digital   
system 2 nudges (reflective)  
is considered manipulative. Therefore, the  
nudge should now be re-considered. 
 
Easy resistibility  
 
   the nudge is easy and cheap 
to avoid. There are no costs to 
avoiding the nudge. 
Non-controlling    no incentive/ coercion was  
introduced to influence  
choice. 
Step 4: Evaluation of the digital nudge and iteration 
 
 
 
 
     the nudge is consistent with the original goal and useful to influence  
     the target behavior 
 there are no unintended negative consequences (e.g.  
 malicious intent, monetary disadvantages) for the target  
 group. 
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goal a digital nudge aims to achieve. On the basis 
thereof the nudger is able to design and implement the 
nudge. Hereby, the nudger needs to be aware of the 
different cognitive systems his target group fluently 
switches in and out of when interacting with the digital 
interface.    
When implementing transparent digital system 1 
nudges (unreflective), automated behavior is being 
influenced, making these types of nudges almost 
impossible to avoid. Although they appear to be 
detectable to the nudgee, they work manipulative in a 
technical (not psychological) way. As they are overt 
and identifiable, these nudges are ethically justifiable. 
Here, the choice architect is held responsible for the 
nudging effects because an individual’s automatic 
thinking guides the user behavior. If an individual is 
nudged against personal preferences, attention bringing 
capacities can be activated and deliberate thinking 
allows the individual to resist the nudge [48]. If the 
goal of a choice architect is to e.g. increase the security 
settings during online purchasing, respective security 
settings could be nudged in a simplified and accessible 
way (e.g. reminders to update settings or increased 
visibility of security options) that the nudgee may 
automatically feel encouraged to update the privacy 
settings.  
When designing non-transparent digital system 1 
nudges (unreflective) manipulation risks are high, as 
they are almost undetectable and influence behavior 
subliminally. Thus, it is difficult for the nudgee to 
reconstruct the ends and means of the nudge or 
perceive all possible options. Hence, choice architects 
should always aim to be in line with user interests. 
However, as individual user interests may be difficult 
to reconstruct for designers, another option is to reveal 
the intentions behind the nudge or request the user’s 
consent. This would require the nudger to implement at 
least one of the following legitimizing conditions: 
disclosure of information or asking user consent as a 
prerequisite to continue using the website. The 
mentioned legitimizing conditions, also known as 
informed consent [14] are however not always 
prompted, especially given the vastness by which users 
move across digital landscapes, oftentimes holding 
multiple registrations with different platform providers. 
In such cases we acknowledge that a ready-to-use 
ethical guideline needs to be aware of the discrepancy 
between ethical nudging and providing the least 
amount of disruption during a user experience. 
Therefore, instead of suggesting to request informed 
consent every time a user logs onto a platform, we 
suggest that priming or signaling nudges could be 
implemented to raise the user’s awareness. This would 
qualify for an information box signaling the users that 
he was nudged according to the preselected default-
settings that were agreed upon during the initial 
registration process on the current platform for 
instance. 
Designing and implementing transparent digital 
system 2 nudges (reflective), entails influencing 
choice in a transparent way, by emphasizing choices 
consistent with the nudgee’s preferences [42]. This 
system of nudges activates reflective thinking, making 
it easy to understand the means and ends of the 
implemented nudge and giving the nudgee the actual 
possibility to make choices without perverting his or 
her decision-making process. These nudges are truly 
libertarian as they influence individuals without 
manipulation or infringement of autonomy. This is in 
line with Tocchetto [63] who argues that only 
reflective (and transparent) nudges are morally 
harmless. Here, the nudger would e.g. use timely 
information nudges as triggers reminding the user of 
the insufficient security settings or provide additional 
information during the user journey on the website to 
encourage the nudgee to reflect password or security 
choices.  
Designing non-transparent digital system 2 
nudges (reflective) on the other hand is considered 
non-paternalistic and manipulative. Although these 
nudges use tools that activate reflective thinking, they 
do not allow the nudgee to reconstruct the means and 
ends of the implemented nudge. Choices are 
manipulated, leading to behavioral change without the 
opportunity to choose differently. Here, nudgees would 
be forced to update or revisit security settings before 
e.g. logging out. Even though this could potentially 
increase the overall security settings it would 
manipulate user behavior and infringe freedom of 
choice. 
Finally, the fourth and last step in the design or 
implementation of ethical nudges is to evaluate the 
nudge and, if necessary, interactively adjust aspects 
according to the principles we have provided. This step 
will be subject to further research. We used a 
heterogenous body of literature as part of our 
methodology to derive the ethical guidelines. 
Therefore, as a final step, we added the evaluation 
and possible iteration of the digital nudge.  By doing so 
we adapted known evaluation processes as part of IS 
research affiliated Design Science Research 
methodologies (see e.g. [52]), which provides an 
important implication for nudging research and its 
constant effort of putting nudging theory into practice. 
We view the evaluation phase of the ethical guidelines 
as a central final step to assure functional purpose and 
target analysis [52] and provide a quality standard as 
part of our key practical contribution to establish 
ethical nudging design guidelines. Namely, the 
evaluation is a reassessment if the results match the 
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expectations (steps 1-3) [53]. After we derived and 
iteratively improved the ethical guidelines for nudging, 
we aim to test and evaluate our guidelines in the future 
(e.g. by designers of digital nudges) to provide 
legitimization for the use of digital nudges in IS 
specific contexts. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we critically reflected the current 
status quo in the ethical discussion on digital nudging. 
We expanded on existing research by drawing between 
libertarian nudges, non-libertarian nudges and 
manipulation. The latter only being present in cases 
where non-transparent nudges are implemented in the 
attempt to alter people’s decision-making processes 
and consequent behaviour in a way they would not 
have chosen by themselves, thus violating their 
autonomy and freedom of choice.  
We conclude, that designers of a choice 
architecture have to be able to defend the used 
measures, thereby self-checking if their nudge 
withstands public scrutiny. Our literature-based 
conceptualization of ethical guidelines very well 
reflects the status quo of the existing academic 
discourse. However, we acknowledge that both, 
providing different case scenarios of the application of 
our guidelines as well as possibly mapping these to the 
structure of a nudging design method, therefore 
allowing us to derive an actual research question, 
would highlight the applicability of our guidelines and 
further improve the contribution to practice. This is 
why we will consider both aspects in future research. 
As a next step, the guidelines need empirical validation 
and discussion with nudgers and nudgees. We hence 
suggest implementing and testing our guidelines in a 
consecutive research project to expand on the 
contribution for practitioners, validate our guidelines, 
and provide a concretized call to action for their 
enforcent.  
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